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An Analysis of Executfve Order 13224 and the "War on Terrorismm 
T y h h U n g  a d  J45h F h  
I .  Purpose 
Does the United States -re terro&s? h debates on the "mr on remrism," th'i qudon has become taboo for 
Amedans to discus. Has tbc Unird Smm (US.) kdsdy perceived the impact of an active role in the Middle East? This paper 
seeks a correlation between U.S. actions in the *war on rmr im"  and rhe potential for increased remrisr activiry. Is terrorism 
on the rise? Is the United Stares responsible for terrorism on the rise? Thronghorn this paper we will look ar terrorism, in the 
Middle East, over a period of time. W e  will dmermine whether for every U.S. action tbcre is an equal and dangerous reaceion 
by the Arab world 
2. The alobal Hegemony Paradigm 
The United States has declared w against aa idea. Throughout the MiddIe Em, rerrorisrn evolved fim a smrqg of 
politid ctrange to include an qression of rdigious Fundament;lrism. The Palwine Liberation Organization (PLQ) stepped off 
stage fbr p u p s  Dke Llamic Jibad, Amm-&Islam, and Al-Qaeda. Politicd discussion and dissent, severely oppressed in most 
of the Middle East, m e r g e d  in religious dismion. uIndcrd them could be no dearw a m p l e  of &is tban Iran . . . a stare in 
which tht oppmed sought solace m religion, and the mosque b-e the center where opposition to the Shah could be amcu- 
lated and sqpnkd, aad &-om which the Aptullahs emerged to EU &the vacuum of political leadership* (GIp Americans saw 
the reaIi y of bow religious fundamendm have frIled rhe politid wcuum on Seprcmber 11,2001. The Bush Adminimation 
h s  placed terrorism as the hrghlight of ow cuacnr foreign ~ol icy focus. T h e  United Stares of h e r i a  is fighting a war against 
terrorism of giobat reach. The enuny is not a single pormcd tegime ar person or digion or ideplo= The m a y  is 
t m ~ m d t a t e d  politidly m o h d  violence papmated again= iaaocenw INationaI Security 5) ," The 
National Sdry Strateg on to say, "Our puoriry will be h t  to dimpt  and + terrorist orgkr ions  of global 
reach and attack their leadership; command, cflnml and communimtiom mat& support, and financw. This wilt have a die 
abling upon the termrim' ability to pIan and o p e m ~  [S)." 
As individuals b a d  on a c d n  moral &it, Americans seek an e v e  n q ~ n s e  to a massive loss of Amerimn life. BE 
Omar Dahbour explains, "Two positions have been p r n o u n t  in a m p =  to assess the ethics of tarorkt acts such as 911 1. 
h, there is a stance of m o d  condemnadon: Tmrisr am are always wrong. Second there is a stance of casual srpknation: 
Nothiag happens without r-n, including the mosc heinous acrions such as terrorist am& (8;3." 
Acm& to Dahbour, "From rbe first standpoint, my attempt at explanation of rcrrorisc acrs is ultimately an m s e  for 
them-beam "p1anatioa is swr as replacing m o d  censure 187): Following the September l Irh a m c k  the idw tbzlr terorisr 
acts are dwap wrong is the domiaant opinion amarrgPtmcdc;m polirid and milimry l&, as wen as the American public. 
Polides ofthe United Sram gwemment, such as Executive order 13224, refim this belief. 
k c t ~ r i v e  adet 13224 was approved by Pddent  B d ,  to udismpr the k c i d  supprr network ht rctroris~ and terror- 
is t  organizations,* an Scpr& 23,200 1. The orckr " a u t h o b  the United Stata government co designate and block the 
assem pf foreign individuals and entities that commit, or pose a signifimr risk of mrnmirdng, acts of temrismP Tbe executive 
order g m  further by ddning terrorism fm of enfotcemcnr. Terrorism is d&ed as, "m activiy tbat (1) involves a 
violent act nr an act dangerous ro bwnan I&, pmpeq, or infraswcnue: and appears (2) to be iacendtd m intimidate or coerce 
a ci& ppularion; to influence the policy of a gavernment by intimidation or coerdon; or & rhe conduct of a go-- 
m a r  by mass danuction, assassiaatian, kidnapping, or haw-mkbggs The definition &at the Bush administdon has 
adopted in hecut2ve order 13224 fits within the perspective ofthe National Securiy Swat=. The information for 
rhe htxmtive order t ~ a s  obtain4 off of a governmenr w&re hap:llwww.st~vIsl~rlslM2OOZ/l6181 .htm 
T a  be ruled by m n ,  rather than by arbi~arg will, is the very definition of W o r n ,  personal and polidd (Grant 1921P 
k u w  order 13224 defines terrorism with an mmprion of arbitrary use of power in d&mce of the rule of law. 
What b not dm inro considefacioa by &t &&e order is rhe use of public opfioa American perception of itself 
within the Middle East w r i e s  an assumprion of the c o m c s s  of our collective p o l i d  &ought and leaves open the potential 
for an Arab badJash. At some level the AI-Qaeda network thrives on a sense of d d i t  at the hands ~f dre WCSC. This p r o p -  
&serves sls a roo1 to reiafhrce popular opinion roward actions by the Udted Scat= and h e  gDvemmenxs the US. has support- 
ed "Recenc devdvprnenm mighr be c k u v d y  parlayed as the latex in an ignominious s&= of histotic Muslim ddaa by rhe 
War t h i  must now be avenged I n d d  rhe wnccpr xlf vengeance has long f ~ r e d  prominendy as a d y i n g  cry in borh Bii 
Isden's and Al-Qaedds masages IHo&ao 54." 
3. Analysis of Data 
The p q e c r i w  the Bush Adminismuon hw prediaa  the c o m e p a t h  of terrorism as a spremic fbm tbar  an be 
hu&r ra a wm or a b. Torim is a vilified entity that must k damyed. President Bush's mince is thar, To& either with 
us or against us,= when it  coma ro m r .  For other aacion-stara where quesdaas of dwdopmenr and d o d c  quality of I& 
mke -a lugher mlc Ptcsirfenr Bush and his &war crrp remisan" haw little impact. Terrorism is the majar ttutat to a s u p q m m  
of a global hegemony becaw all other imrnda~e  rhmfs ere obsolete in such a paradigm, An und* bdiefthat the m z m ~  
renw of renorism is on the & and is h m h g  more pmnounced is shown in how Amtrim 'foreign policy makw arc h- 
ing thur b u d p  and agendas, Our fim aaalysis look at the otxummc of tarorism to see if it has bced rising as the Ameritatl 
Yit?Wpohlt seems tb SUgpESC. 
An aaalph of the r o d  acts o f t m h  from fbe p r  1981 wtiI the ymr 2004 was p d I e  through figures o h i n d  by 
die MTP'F Tertrrrimn K ~ Q w I +  Database. This aon-pmfir oqphrion has inqra'ted dam &om RAND T m & m  
Chronology 1968-1997; RAND *-MXPT Terrorism Incident Database (1 9 3 & p m t ) ;  Terrorism Lndicrment d a t a k  
{Udlmsiry of A r b ) ;  and DFT Tntmtiond's researcll on terrorist vqpnizadons. The dma d%ss from other sources wail- 
able such as one acc-BIe on a gwunmenr web domain: http:f lwww.sta~ee~/d~ttr~~/~~nizati~d2Q125.P& 
Tht inhmt~~iun fDom the X n d d g e  D d a w  is  likely tbe most cornprrhmsive and irs information mn be ~mowcd to 
look at spacffic criteria. 
~ ~ n m & ~ ~ r ~ ~ ~ & i o d h ~ f ~ ~ ~ t h e i a ~ i n . t i m e ~ m o & u n i t  ofmeper. 
ptar. Our Wg. Ia -an: Ydiwhdedan ib;t d t  of& a d p i s  4 a + i i h c e  Icvcl of ~ 0 2 .  A d h k n t  d 
7.720 qpm d m  thee$  a tm~d dmxswe ofn+ elght,h@u~~ ye& ~BW t£w past t w m c y - h u r ~  Tbis ~ t ~ s t m f ~  fbr 
only 2.5% of rhe to& incidents accurdng in 1381, cbc fht year obmd and as the data showed it is anything bm a m d y  
pattern of decrease. The dam shows, regadless, that m r i s m  is, in facr, occurring 1ms frequently. It appmrs that termrim darts 
exbibit the capabilities to show mends. Thost trends jlrsr are nur the same mads as is refkted by mrxctlt US. poIicp, T b e  less 
Frsquent occurrence of terrorism is correrr for the span of rime that we sampled bur &ere havc been dative rises of&quenq 
during certain portions of [be m d  time xquence. 
Occasional s p i k  in the rime line can be attdbured to d o u s  o c a m m ~ ~ ~ .  O n e  sigDicant grampk is a spike in ramria 
acrivi y h a t  oarred in the p r s  19W1885. During h e  d y  1 980's the Ragan adminisuation mmpred to act on a policy 
of diplomatic acthrism laid out in September 1982 under whar ha ts d e d  rhe Plan." Tbe Udrd Stare wodd 
evennralIy witbdmw from an affivc Eole Wowing ebe mjm d a c k  of the 19.83 bombing of h e  United States Marine Corps 
barracks in Ekirur, ZRbnnon. Why then in during &c end of 1384 and the beginning of 1985 wa these a s i g d c a n t  spike in 
t w r i s t  aetiviry;l 
The United States inidally rook an active m1e in rhe Middle Easr for h x  reasons. The fim ms KO mitigate &r rde  o f h  
after the Islamic rwolurion in 1 979. The mmnd was to develop a &eat for rhc Lhanae CiviI War and h e  AmbXstdi I 
conflict. The third was to devise a way to comer the Soviet hvasim of Af$aaistaa (Rubin 2). "The Reagan P h  proposed 
t&e estabbhmcnt of a Jodauiil~pWest Bask ~ t i o u  as a f;%mewo& for Wadnian &d&narion- It also mpgest'ed that, I 
in a c h g e  f ir  had's yielding most defit accupied terriro ry, tbc Arab wadd m g n i ~ e  its m a h d  and agree to &torid 
compromk on the West I b k  &at would enhance Ismel's seturiy Rubin 21." 
The spike in temrist acriviry in 19%1985 dmc s p  is mwd by thc "expuimmmrion ofpalitic. & a n d  and rhe 
grow& of religious fimdamendism as a &tic of Arab regimes wppoed by tbc United SW. Jo& had allied i d w i t h  the 
Pdesdnian Liiemrion Organimtion to gumtee n sdment  af he Arab-&& m d i a  and re w p t  the FLU'S power over 
the W a  3a&. While Syria and JRbaaon wodd join in ctxe h i o a  there wodd anage internal corlmdidofls in rhe bar- 
gaining positions and goals of each $me (Rubin 21. 
Foflowing the wirhdrawal of U.S. ~ o v p s  from liebanon, the parties inyol~ed m the A & - M  cadict atmpred to mke 
h e  into their own hands. 'A conjunction of q i o d  M o p m e n t  in h e  opening months of 138% urn, more 3aible 
Government in Israel and King H m p H  seeming success in d 1 ' i i n g  a joint Jordanian-PID barpining position (Rubin 31." 
The attempts Middle Emem peacg set orst by the Ragan adminimadon would M due w , h e  "indecermimre policy of the 
PL.0 and the framework witbin whicfi negotiation& would be conducted (Rubin 4)" The paradrp within the Middle Easr had 
&mgd to dm the g m d  of Islamic f u n h e n &  For the United States, according to Rubin, llIts attcmprs w w1-d 
iw MUTC to molveth~ ArabIsmeli con#ict o h  seemed to didt acrimonious readox~s in tbe am, px it was d universxlly 
a c h d e d g d  tbar only Wasbgmn codd h e r  m y  w d  s d m e n r  (I)." 
h i c  fundmncllisa wodd gain a foorhold in Atab public opinion in 1991 during rhc h &waz A core argumeat 
&AT-Qacda Is &e faothold dmt U.S. troops made by enteriag Sarrdi Arabia in 1391. yeam ago, he argued thar thc 
'Gusder d r a y  forces' of the United Sram and United Kingdom had e~~ahlighed a &head in Saudi Arabia from which 
thtp hmdd to impose anewkmpedisn on h e  Middle East in ordm to gain comrol over the regions oil w d t h  (Hoffman 
41.- 
Re+tmmr of new members rn At-+& have c e n r d  on two arguments. The fim is the e x k m c ~  of tbe Smte oflsraet. 
The m d  is tbe of U.S. forces neas the m holiest phas in Wan; &e cities of Merxa and Modina. O m a  Bin 
ladm would bq$n his b r  j i i  a p h x  rhe U i d  Smres by W n g  Ms opposition to the US. in the Dechtioa afWar 
@g&m abc Am& 0 c m ~ ' ~ ~ g  fkC. LIW16l ofthe Twa Hob P b .  Web sir=, which d new m e m b  tcr Al-Qda, a 
simple logic; (1) the Wm is implacably hastile to Islam (2) the only way to address tbis h i a t  and tbc only Ian- d m  d ~ e  
West undemands is the logic ofviolence and (3) jihad is the only option. 
At the beginning ofhe ntwmiflennium we see: a d i d  spike in nworisr d t y  bllowing tht Scp& I I& atmeh. 
Islamic fundamendins have used the concept ofwmpnce to pin supporr fbr new remits, As rhe Unired Sm*s has pushed 
M e r  into the Middle East, particularly laq, AI-Qa& atrwrpts ED nua &e situa&n ta their a d w w  *ParricuI* ar a 
dme whw dil-Qeda is wakened, the call for revenge muplod wid tSrr regcaeratjvt powet ofa single, new dramatic terrorist 
am& muld breathe new lik into die mwement (I-i&an 6): Terrorists hme wed the power of the Internet, mch as the 
stmctiv~ Al Nada web she, to rhdr advantage- "In panic&, arridcs pastad an thc sire have 50Mt to h w  a connection 
bemeen rhc d-don of the world ~ n d c  Cater and rhc nanulativc hl~w-ck apim the U.S. economy by h e  &pmber 
62 ~ ~ f d  I 
1 1& amcks. b o n g  the dsims of profif the site o b  are the weakening smng& of oht Ameticaa dollar, the precipitous 
d d n c  of rhe U.S. stock market, md the loss of confidence both at home and abroad in the American economy (Ho&an 
I I)." 
Osama Bin Laden has rhrived on, aad is expeain& the pcrsisrence of U.S. forces. For termrims there is a cornparha 
men the etlrrenr anilia and che Vietnam W ~ L  Since the inmion of Iraq, h e  conventional wisdom among Islamic 
p u p s  bar been that Ameba  forces will eapidare if drawn into a longmggle. As Bruce Hohaa mplains, "Further, in 
a 9 April 2003 declaration p d  on a1 Qaeda's phantom website, Al N&. . . the v h c s  of p d l a  w a d b  are again l a a y  
exrolled . . 
The A m c r I a  were d & d  in Vie- and the Soviers were d & ~ d  in Af&animaa 
This is the method rbar apdcd rhe direct C r u d e r  calonialism hrn most of the M u s h  
laads, with Al@a the mpst well horn. Howem, &c9e a m n p ~ b m  proven hat tfic most 
effecrive method for rhc marexEdJIq. we;lk a p i m  tbe strong i s  g d I l a  wadire (Hofbaa 7). 
We can rcaoactbdy amibutc i a c d  temrEst involmenr to spacific ma- pdicy Even thou& certain regard 
mux be taken fbr the wry specific incidenrs that cause individuals to ttndtrra%c omwnism, the incidents should curadatidy 
reflect -m&t d circmmmm that hepnonic policy -its or promotes. Etidene has shown it is not- rhe w e  
t a r i m n  has b r a e  become more fi-equmt. The possibility &at tcmh isa more &nus problem sjnce 2000 dl egims 
becatwe of temrrisrs whose a&ns d t  in more dea& and injury than in piwiaus years. With rhc most devasmhg of all such 
at& m i n g  widin recent memory, it i nndetstandabIe why &ere &srs the i m p d o n  char h e  I&pr of terrorism is 
in-. 
Qur w n d  -ion & s i ~  of the o&d d u e  af the year to tbe tod number of deaths is an atrempr to dispiay an 
a m m  ta the proposition in the pmious pmgmph. Tbe dam a@ m p l d  was h r n  1981 annually through 2004. T h o  shter 
s& of rtrc am& an Septdw 11,2001 d w d i  rhe amrage level af d t i e s  in an a d  Two models haw been provided 
hr this mend, ThE k t  m d d  considrrs the 9/3 1 attach as an outtier sdnicafy. The mm11d m& includes h e  rod  in its 
ddat ion .  
In bdefwmmary of thest d w  neirhm model swned to prove any sign%-t staristic tmd. It is impo55fbte to td 
whether mrim is e.&xtivdy becoming m o x e l d .  Of the two fiw Fig 2 "8egrcssien: ~ e a t h " . ~ ~  i n d u b  the 
rods fm Septmber 11,2001 is possibly el- to depicting a tmbd yer still hh far short of any q d l t  s i if imne I d .  
As our w n d  u n d ~ d d n g  in +sis oftermism, .we have p&mcd data on Amerimn budget allomions far two ofthe 
most obvious Eaaeign p I i q  t& fareign ~d mdmilimry -dim. lvlilimtp expixdim &odd mnfam to the current 
starus of e n  die armed farm am e t n c h g  and h e  pd pohv s u u m  ofthe e x e a ~ z k  branch. Fmign aid seam 
1- likely to haw a mgible lmpaer on &emd number of mimist i d c n w .  U,S. Fo+ aid is, howwer, often associated as a 
pmnrative m d o d  against termrkm Among nattoesraw what free and open op5nion is not to16~2~td it is not i n m d k  
IA 
&ar foreign aid is somehow conamd ro tdtmrism as tbe must vioIent form of prous. The dam for the budget was obrained 
&of a pwmmcnt wcbs' i~  Imp:Ilumw.whit&ouse.~~ombhd&e Jfy2004Ipdtrbist.pdf. 
This 6pre  su- that &ere is same sott of cprmecr'on betw- mndg in the budget data for krnational Askance 
Outlays md the c o d  number of terrorist incidents in a given yew. The si@fimncc lwcl for d i i  codation is ,007. Aa a check 
to chis model, a &ng of h e  y d y  rrend of the mistance outlags (Fig. ti) shws a smnger m&on hr jusr a general 
d m  in the outlays dong a p r i y  &is. Jhk double d a t i o x 1  would not be probiernark cxc@pt that ir makts It posrible 
rhgt simpIy both have d d n g  slopes and that rhe oignifbnce in &e w o n  auld bc accounred far by rhis similariry. Lt is 
to mnsider otba hctors as respsiblr k u s e  the isoiated trends of p r l y  deumse are stranger than the cross c o d a -  
tion. 
Statistical irrformarioa for faaign aid sbows m unfortunane disc~vcrp. Most public knowidg af forcigp aid, in the U,S., 
shows a use of "soft pmwmn MiIitary aid however, can be considered the majoriy of foreign aid given by h e  United Smns each 
v. h & n g  to &e S t a r h i d  Absrract of the United S m ,  when ranked che mp EEvr d p i e n r s  are W, Egypr? Columbia, 
Jordan, and Rush (812). "bmet is the lwt e p i e n r  of U.S. aid in the world, receiving just under om 6fth of total U.S. far- 
dgn aid (&dull& 3): Wm tbe daa ro be aceeptbd as supporting a mrrelari~n &en it would s u g p t  thar in- in foreign 
aid lead to incram in terrorism. This may sound ldimus ar f'rrst but it maka sense when considering rhar potenrially con- 
versial milirarp aid t~ a a t i o n a ~ e  like Isracf, Egypt, znd Jordan are ohen categarizd by tbe pvmmmt as foreign assistance, 
Tbis concept hcfds more legitimaq when ane considers the waning acceptance of the corrnprion and d c r i o n  of by rhe 
Egyptian and Jordanian govmmea~ as w d  as negative opinions many Muslim p p l e  have widr the existme of the Smre of 
Israel. 
Def O*
Despite the mlts ofIntemariortal M r a n c e  Owlap rbe modd illusrrad in Fig. 5 "Dd O u W ~ d t n u ' '  shows 
promise of a rme rodt ion.  The s i p 8 c a n a  Id of h e  cslaaeaian between the pe&tag on the f;sdsaI budga for 
milhay me and tht momr of tmrisr indiknrs is -000. This is the sttaapt don on all rhe mod& up to rhis poiar. 
This is manger rhan the p d y  demexing m d  thar is shawn in theytzdy am~onr oftemrim a& as perRg. 
Since the t lecrwe in ddcax: o n d a ~  more accumtely follows its m inhaat rmrly wnd and in turn h e  kcidcam stmag- 
ly modcl the defense ourlays trend, it is likely &.at tbe d&si: eudays arc a fattor of the incident modal and not v i a  wm. The 
relationship &om b r  fn the 7 that the globel trqpnony spends mare on milirary wp-enses an in- im t~aoxist acts OD 
an inrematiod basis can be expeasd 
"The presence of US. militaty bam in bdi Arabia, Qamr, the UAFL, and W- well as regular military training and 
arcdm with Egypt, Jordan, and M o m c c ~ h  vicwcd as a n w  American r n l o ~ a l i ~ m  and a m y  to areagthen American conml 
ovet American control OW Arab oil md& 61." Wrrh milimry mnml, it is b e l i d  dlar pdJjEical and economic control by 
the Unic~d Smres will follow. *Although the a d m i d o n  of President George W- Bush insim thar Jle U.S. war on tmr ism 
i s  not a war an Z s b ,  rhis is not what is r e p o d  in tht M media, in s e e  by Arab iaders, and in the minds of many 
Arabs CAbdttHah 6): 
Saudi Arabia is a d a  m p l e  of a dangaons mud among Arab naeons. The natian is one of the two inrellecd antem 
for Islamic fundamentalism. "It needs to import r d m a l o ~  pmrm ia borders, and a e a ~  jobs for Saudis. However, Saudi 
intad plitia m a t  that the d d -  for gu& o h  bp gerting the mmt of irs most conservntive 
s u p p o r r d e  SaIafh (the U.S. pres mmmody refus to them as W W i )  (Sanec 55)P The 1.3 tfiUion dollars d w  Saudt 
Arabia has rectivd from oil has seduced the house of Saud to rapidly modernize the country. "However, &e SaIafis do nor wish 
to see Saudi rnoderaiy Crete a m o e  wmpt, wcst-eraizsd socicty that auld tum people away from h e  w a d P  of God 
( h c c  581: 
Among Islamic EtkndamcndJsff h e  perception is thar cwmp~ g m m e n w  art pmPpcd up by rhe United Stares. '71 is 
worth noring h a  bt rhe United Staccs has provided many Arab couatrik induding Fgpr,  Jordan, Morocco, tho: M&m 
Aurhoriry and orhers with economic aid, b-, rhe people m v  t h a x  aid as U S  sup* far rhe uademmtk regimes in 
hose mundcs and not for otal ddopment  (Abddlafi 31." G o v ~ r s  in h e  Middle h r  do nor improve the situation for 
Arabo by continuing to irrvest in i n d d  inhtmcture and not b m  capital. Axab education and wages are scpaar, Tbt 
annual m t ~  of v h  in incoma has demascd wrhrandy. 'The conrinuation of the statm quo in which millions of Arabs are 
o p p d  and p d m  is rhe main rman fbr h e  tsbmizarion of the A d  maws who a n  only join WC organizations as 
become more digions since poltid phcs,  politid participation, free prm, and q x d  are fixbidden. Arab 4 m e s  deny 
their people demomq, but marrot prweat them &om Joining Islamic oqmim-ioas or h r n i n g  more reliiow, since to do so 
wodd be inttrpmed as hostility towards lsIara Wdullah 8): Foreign and M i E i q  aid bp &e Wted Smm ro ttre Arab world 
wiU increase tbt likcIihood of eexrslrisr activity &mu& individuah which seek political pmicipatian thra* the only means 
m d a b k  mosque. 
The United Nations human developmenr program bas monirored the devdopmcnr of &e Arab-wodd &mu& the 
A l r a m h  Htrmaa D&prqrnt Index. (% &omm&t 2). This Index has been part of an AJ& Human X)evelopmenr Report 
developed by the &ired Nations ear:h pr. 
The barrier to better Arab pcrbunance is not a lack of resources, canduds tht q w t ,  
but the lamentable shomg~ of three w a r &  W o r n ,  hmledw and w o m a n p ~ ~ ~ ~ .  
Not having enough of dmz amounts ta wh~t  he authors 4 the eon's  rhree '&ts. 
It is rhsse ddcirs, &ey argue, &zt hoH the huswtaLAr&s back from r d h g  their 
p e n t i b d  all* them of &e wodd to despise and to fear a deadly combinadon of 
d t h  and ba-cgs (;T;kpEcmomht3}. 
A made! {see nexr ~ e }  look s p d d l y  at a rmmt act dtqpd to combat tewlrism and arrmprs to evaluate it mc- 
cessfulness.'rfris acr k h a t i v e  O&r 13224- Our a d p i s  of tetrori~r activity s i d  13224 for the debition of remrisrn used 
by &e goverslment The executive order has mort impact on our d as a gauge sf whecher or not the tacrics of the United 
Sfam in the War on Tesarism" ;ur a d y  working. k u t i v e  Order 13224 d d d  a s e  ofnational emqencp ~~g 
the September I1 rh arm&. "In g e n d  rams5 tbe Ordet provides a means by wh& ro disrup~ the financid supporr network 
fbr verrr~rists and terrorist ~ r i ~  by authorizng the USb gowmment ro &pate and block the s e t s  of foreign indi- 
v idul  and entiti= tbar commit, ar pmc a significant dsk otcommitting, acrs of m h P  Thc EbIlowing i n f o d o n  for h e  
exemrive a& was obtained &of a gmmmne website: h r c p : t l ~ ~ s ~ ~ v ~ d ~ I r W & 2 0 0 ~ 1 6 1 8  1 -him. 
Conventional wisdom among the U,S. mil+ a ~ ~ I c d g c s  the enormous f i n a n d  k of Osama Bin Laden. A t Q d a  
in its initial days was single handedlp h a n d  by the Km Laden fortune. Tht U.S. govemmenr believes thar by fmqbg tbe 
WCTS of Bin ladm rhe h d  base of the organization will dry up, The order is intended to anow the U.S. p e m m ~ ~ ~ r  to 
& mad legal actions. Pmpmty and bitera in p r o w  thar comes within possession of& United Srares, or U S  persow 
arc b M  Any M c d o n  or dding wirb U.S. p e n s  or within h e  United States in property or iartirsts in property is 
prohibited Any ~ r i o a  w mde tfie ~ U Y C  order or conspim~to violate rhe m~nrdve o& is illegal- Emall& civil and 
&id p e n b  be d for viohtim 
S N ~  ~ p u ~  about die effects off 3224 create pmblems.for dment Erst is the f a  onareas where she US. 
govanmeat has jhdiaion. J 4 c d o a  indude U.S. sovereign ~ ~ q ,  and ateas of US. ompation. C u m r  l a b h i p  of 
A Q d a  d d e s  in pgraphi~  "jlo ma& Jan$ beyond &e ran& of U.S. troops. The gunrnntee OF& ~vemmma TO 
& action on 13224 is aot g u m m e d  The m d v e  a&r is not a may &inding vrirh other oations but an mxt~tivc order of 
the P&r of die Uzlitarf Swea &Sq&ad by rhe gownmmt web sire, use by &er rmrion-statcs of 13224 is a service 
af the Uaid Scams and mt a quirement. 
The & of 19224 arc inmdcd as n detenmc to mppn h r  Mamie fitndamm& CAW. Donations ox mntribdons 
to &gnat& individuals or muties are avoided. Public awwmes of hdividix& at en* Mtd to t m m b  &odd be 
h+m& hd infa-n hr other swcteign nations, allied with the Unid Saw, h o m e  d I e .  Tht, mqst coauo- 
&d claim of 13224 is d m  it will disrupt rm&t new&, mtting offacass ro fjmancid and atber resource h m  s p ~ p  
rhizrrs, rh+ wxwumgin~ inMd and en- ta gcr om of rtrt *mdsm b&-P The&rma!tion for tfPe Exewtlve 
order was qbtakoed 0% of a g o v m m ~ ~ ~ t  webhe ~ . l I ~ ~ d d $ s / ~ 2 0 0 3 I l 6 1 8 1  h m  
Out evidence shows rhat as the of or& 13224 h c l w i  to -fffu?ze d m o ~  mmdsrs and rerrorist support 
pups &me 4 no disqm~b1e deamc in &number ~f &as commitred wet a camqmddiag time k c .  Jf.an$ng the &- 
tiorisbip iPi pwitive in nature and a m  afterm+n havc b e ~  o c a r h g  nwre hqtl.endy o m  time W e  annor gtmm~ee tbar 
3re mmutive order bas been entidy indkmd; h m ,  there is no widenee available to say that thc order is s n 4 .  The 
$ a possIb&ty that h e  Mid& Eas-t is qdtncing a spike in t~~ actiuiv which is being s&ened by U S  policy d as 
13224. Our data, howwa mggcm that tbc act is not d d y  sroppiry: an incrPagc ie temrrism. 
The bsr of p u p s  i&r8Ed is largely m m p d  of Arab p u p  and is wring m sop5 rpillious u p  &onr; of funds. It is 
i m p o m t ~ t h e k c ~ t h a r i n ~ d ~ m n o t b e i a g ~ p d  b y t b i s a c t i s o b d &  i t i s t i m e f o r f u m p a l i ~ g ~  
Either rhe  method h e  a a  is pufsaing is wroag or mmrist qpda rely less an h d i n g  than the patagon suqmm. While our 
research dm not wppon the mod of& it does s u g p  that in i d f  ir is emimly iriadeqw and that die End anwx 
rex&derefrom 
Al-Qaeda i d 1  althou& a l a d y  o p i a e d  $tru= is dezipcd mtmd a mmnt buaistsrs model. As we mcotiod, 
Eb ~ b ; h s a n ~ I y l a r g z ~  k w h i c h  h a s k n d w  6 n a n c e ~ e A l ~ o ~ t i o n .  k s q b e  
mbIing for the carparate mdd ro dut an imanadod m o & t  h a  pi- up be bbwsldlls Ebty use 
Juw as huge, mdtimtional b&es conghnear m d  tbc 13905 
to rnow linear; hner and ~WQM taruecurcs, bin laden did tbe same wit4 
al-Qda. On the one hand, bin M m  LEas frmaiond like the preridant or CEO 
of a large mu hinational corporation by dcfming #c & and aims, issuing 
orders: and ensuring deir impierxlenmtiou (HoEmaa 31. 
B1-@A L tbe USE of the roofs of globalizadon against globalization. 13in Ladm is m i n d  in rhe modem mhdqucs of 
business and has used &em ro achiwe fundamtndsr ends. It is a dmjon of the " b ~  ofboth wrlds" that the Wahhab's 
have sought in Saudi M i a .  "Bin Laden, though is perhaps kt viewed as a terrorist CEO, wmridly having appIid business 
adminimtion and m c d m  management techniques learned borb ar university and in the &llJs mnmcrion business m the 
running oF a tmsnarhnal term- organization Wo&nan 41." 
Conclusion 
In the starrmtnt ofpqmse to thi* paper we had add rht reader, l*Dscs the U.S. mate te rmrid"  Pcthaps it would be 
more appropsiare to ask a different question. Does the United States see who and what it is they art fighting in chis "war an 
ternrim?" h the supecpuwa of a &bat h ~ m o n p  the perspeak of ch United Stat& is altered cornpad to othcr hdividu- 
als ot entities. T h e  rtspnse of rbt US. inundatdy Wwing the S1:ptmbcr 11 th am& mn be jus&ed and to the world 
seemed approprim. After four years we have begun to question tbe i n i d  &&ticss, of our actions. Our rwponse has to 
wolw ro mmr the rediy of what w t  kce in the hurt. 
"Put another~~ay what is the '&id wodd' or inol-a1 u n W  within which cemrisrn ewists-and wen m m s  justifiable ro 
m y  people. One an= to this qu&ion is rhar remrism o m m  in Athe mod univeist o ~ m p ~ ~ ~ ,  bemuse empim arc 
p d y  those & a l l y  corrupt sf;tns dm engendkr wctiom such as terrorirrn {though nor only that maion) f M b o u r  911.'' 
In, a discussion on ~mrism, pare innocents, nor complere @t, of the United States should be considwed. 
Thc United Srats bas engag~d in two actions, which bme drawn thc wrah of bfamic ftmdameamlists. Support for csxmtpr 
Arab ~ ~ G D C S  is one. Blind suppazt far the Smte ofhael, despite ia axions in the Arab-Ism& mdicr, is the second. For 
rhe prom*on of U.S. oil intern& cormpr, oppressiw gavtmmmn haye been popped up by bath *soft* and *hard* puwa tbr 
too long. 
But the Arab pcnp1.c don't app""" US. economic and militarp aid to &me 
cowrries bemuw hey believe rhar U.S. aid simply supports those andemwatic 
regimes and nor the countria Of cowe, Arab qimes, and Arab media 
discuss U.$ aid to tbeir awn conn.rries very mu&, and rb is  has Id many to think 
tbat a large part of this aid eventually ends up in h e  p h r e  accounts of corrupt 
members of the regimes (Abchllah 51. 
In rbe cantem of gIobaliaation, bath the XS. and rhe Ar%b mdd have to overwfnt a cultural learning nwe. "It is evident 
that it is Globalization. . . as rhe s p d  of hrmdyWcscem social and rulrural relations, m o b  of iatwdo~l, d m d w  d u e s  
and Me& e c ~  L a r e d  by advance9 in communi~atian and other d n o l o g i a  assclciatcd thmw&&t has b e  the 
immediate issue {G1ym 121$." Cultural elites, like the W h b i s ,  are &ag tht influx of infbmstian &at &y h e h e  can 
d h n e  &dr shm& and tbe mmg& of a rrligious argmiicnt. Breakdown of commmiq and s o d  responsiblility, the 
b d d o w n  d & e  M y ,  d promiscuity, and drug abuse are blamed on Wtsfem culnue, The pwidvcs of western pMo- 
sophid coacepu rhar l i d  w e  arc b o n d ,  %bed n;ltio&m is c h d  by eoduttional dmacrary, including o 
mag cornmimeor co rdigious and ethnic impartiditp anrd inclusiwess, or the equal hi&m of dl, r c g d k  of didow 
and orher pardcuhhic hrms of idcntiv (23)." 
One can compare rhe apodyptic mesage to how Cbtistian fundamendim warn of the destruction of American sodq 
W&n tht U.S. mpoa to the September 11th am& there is a distinct r$igious tone. The sug%asdon &ar it k &e U n i d  
States' mponsibiliy or Athe rqmnsibilitp of an earrirly pow=, to 'rid h e  wodd of evil' is close ta idolany from an o ~ o x  
Christian pohr of view (Lit& 22): Thc Uairod States mwc empe rfre paradigm of power among m i *  nations, which is 
used for Y ~ d r f  and "smbiv to look ax power tr, srand fur wmpcciag socia and civic claims. 
Bhd support for he l ,  in rT&t of ~@JIH Paldnians, will be much more painftll Eor Ehe US. to =me EO rams 
with in &e Arab world. To many Palestinians, the Scate of h e l  is a mm spomd rerrorisrrisr To Arabs rhm are many darn- 
menfed times where mmrism mu commitred by hael Palestinians. AcziMcs of the Stem Gang are 4 m* 
(C&m If 9). * !  ofcourse, *y h d i  dImry fb- w&& may be engaged in mge&g n a n c o m h r  c'rviliaas. 
A n A ~ ~ O f ~ ~ 1 3 2 2 # a n d r b r ~ o n ~ t "  
" " -  I' 
And & mrmbess of any gowmmt, such as h r  of the govu-nmcnts they repmens e, on his view, terxaim as w d  ( G I p  
119): 
'The q.ueuan dm the Arabs have co~bnuaudy a d d  cficmdves h r  &e last h a l f - n t ~ p  is why tbe United Smw pm- 
vides Issazl with such p ~ w  politid, economi~ and milimy mpporc. The amwer &at bas h a  given to &em is &at h e  
Wtsz and especidlyheria -fed b e I  aad &I hid wu Wi only rdhbtc m t q i c  h c e  a@= rhe Soviet bloc during 
the Cald Wir and Zs dl their outpdsr in their &rts to ~ n t r 0 1  rhe ma fAbddsb 51." & die hmdm af rbc State of h d  in 
1949, the Unfted  he^ will a h q s  hve a inrema in the $4 of hael. A m n g  p h d  lobby in rhe Udred Staw 
cotnrinucs w push fmsmnga support oftfie polidd, economic, aad d h y  nee& of the  Sme. Far the Uaitcd Sam m mIp. 
bq$n to makt hotholds In tbe M&e East it amrst come ro terms wi& its past support of mrrupr Arab dictatars aad blind 
loplty to Israd Arabs thro+uut theMiddk East arc &are ofthese &i.odips and w dearly the hjpmiq sf a nation, 
which daims to p m  Wk, l i b j  and tbe of happinex" 
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